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Cognition without content
Paul Schweizer1
Abstract.   According to the traditional conception of the mind, 
semantical  content  is  perhaps  the  most  important  feature 
distinguishing  mental  from  non-mental  systems.  And  this 
traditional conception has been incorporated into the foundations 
of contemporary scientific approaches to the mind, insofar as the 
notion  of  ‘mental  representation’  is  adopted  as  a  primary 
theoretical  device. Symbolic representations are  posited as  the 
internal structures that carry the information utilized by intelligent 
systems, and they also comprise the formal elements over which 
cognitive computations are performed. But a fatal tension is built 
into the picture - to the extent that symbolic ‘representations’ are 
formal  elements  of  computation,  their  alleged  content  is 
completely gratuitous. I argue that the computational paradigm is 
thematically  inconsistent  with  the  search  for  content  or  its 
supposed vehicles. Instead, the concern of computational models 
of cognition should be with the  processing structures that yield 
the  right  kinds  of  input/output  profiles,  and  with  how  these 
structures can be implemented in the brain.12
1 CLASSICISM
According to the traditional conception of the mind, semantical 
content  is  perhaps  the  most  important  feature  distinguishing 
mental from non-mental systems. For example, in the scholastic 
tradition revived by Brentano [1], the essential feature of mental 
states is their ‘aboutness’ or intrinsic representational aspect. And 
this  traditional  conception  has  been  incorporated  into  the 
foundations of contemporary scientific approaches to the mind, 
insofar as the notion of ‘mental representation’ is adopted as a 
primary  theoretical  device.  For  example,  in  classical  (e.g. 
Fodorian) cognitive science, Brentano’s legacy is preserved in the 
view that the properly cognitive level is distinguished precisely by 
appeal to representational content. There are many different levels 
of description and explanation in the natural world, from quarks 
all the way to quasars, and according to Fodor, it is only when the 
states  of  a  system are  treated as  representational  that  we  are 
dealing with the genuinely cognitive level. 
The  classical  paradigm  in  cognitive  science  derives 
from Turing’s  basic  model  of  computation  as  rule  governed 
transformations on a set of syntactical elements, and it has taken 
perhaps its most literal form of expression in terms of Fodor’s 
Language  of  Thought  hypothesis  (henceforward  LOT)  [2], 
wherein  mental  processes  are  explicitly  viewed  as  formal 
operations  on  a  linguistically  structured  system  of  internal 
symbols. In particular, propositional attitude states, such as belief 
and desire, are treated as computational relations to sentences in 
an internal processing  language,  and where the  LOT sentence 
serves to  represent  the  propositional  content of  the  intentional 
state.  Symbolic representations  are thus posited as the internal 
structures  that  carry  the  information  utilized  by  intelligent 
systems, and they also comprise the formal elements over which 
1 School  of  Informatics,  Univ.  of  Edinburgh,  EH8  9LE,  UK.  Email: 
paul@inf.ed.ac.uk.
2
cognitive  computations  are  performed.  According  to  the 
traditional  and  widely  accepted  belief-desire  framework  of 
psychological explanation, an agent’s actions are both caused and 
explained by intentional states such as belief and desire. And on 
the LOT model,  these states are sustained via sentences in the 
head that  are formally  manipulated by  the cognitive processes 
which lead to actions. 
Fodor  notes  that  particular  tokens  of  these  LOT 
sentences could well turn out to be specific neuronal processes or 
brain states. The formal syntax of LOT thus plays a crucial triad 
of roles: it can represent meaning, it’s the medium of cognitive 
computation, and it can be physically realized. So the syntax of 
LOT  can  in  principle  supply  a  link  between  the  high  level 
intentional  description  of  a  cognitive  agent,  and  the  actual 
neuronal process that  enjoy  causal  power.  This  triad  of  roles 
allows content bearing states, such as propositional attitudes, to 
explain salient pieces of behavior, such as bodily motions, if the 
intermediary  syntax  is  seen  as  realized in  neurophysiological 
configurations  of  the  brain.  Because  the  tokens  of  LOT  are 
semantically interpretable and physically realizable, they form a 
key  theoretical  bridge  between  content  and  causation.  In  this 
manner,  a  very  elegant  (possible)  answer  is  supplied  to  the 
longstanding theoretical  question of how mental states, such as 
beliefs and desires, could be viewed as causes of actual behaviour, 
without violating fundamental conservation laws in physics.  
So  at  first  sight,  this  computational  approach  to 
cognition might seem to provide a compelling and harmonious 
theory of the mind/brain, potentially uniting the traditional notion 
of  mental  representation with the  causally efficacious level  of 
neural machinery. But alas, a fatal tension is already built into the 
picture: a central purpose of the symbolic structures is to carry 
content, and yet,  to the extent that they are formal elements of 
computation,  their  alleged  content  is  completely  gratuitous. 
Computation is essentially a series of manipulations performed on 
uninterpreted syntax, and formal structure alone is sufficient for 
all effective procedures. The specification and operation of such 
procedures makes no reference whatever to the intended meaning 
of the symbols involved. Indeed, it is precisely this limitation to 
syntactic  form that  has  enabled  computation  to  emerge  as  a 
mathematically  rigorous  discipline.  If  syntax  alone  is  not 
sufficient,  and  additional  understanding  or  interpretation  is 
required, then the procedure in question is, by definition,  not an 
effective  one.  But  then  the  purported  content  of  mental 
‘representations’ is rendered superfluous to the computations that 
comprise  the  ‘cognitive’  processes  of  cognitive  science.  The 
intended  interpretation of  internal syntax makes absolutely no 
difference to the formal mechanics of mind. 
2 CONNECTIONISM 
For a number of years now there has been a high profile struggle 
between opposing camps within the computational approach to 
the  mind.  In  contrast  to  the  classical  paradigm derived from 
Turing,  connectionist  systems  are  based  on  networks  of  large 
numbers of simple but highly interconnected units that are brain-
like in their inspiration. But according to Fodor [3], the brain-like 
architecture of connectionist networks tells us nothing about their 
suitability as models of  cognitive processing, since it still leaves 
open the question of whether the mind is such a network at the 
representational  level.  He  concedes  that  the  connectionist 
approach may be the right type of architecture for the medium of 
implementation, which would mean that it characterizes a level 
below that of genuine mental structure. In view of the foregoing 
tension within the classical  paradigm concerning formal syntax 
and the ineffacacy of content, I would argue that Fodor is on very 
weak  ground  when  he  insists  that,  within  a  computational 
approach, the representational level is fundamental. However, a 
number of connectionists have taken up the challenge and seek 
out  ways  of  projecting representational  content  onto  artificial 
neural networks. 
One comparatively recent such attempt (Churchland [4], 
Laakso, A. and G. Cottrell [5], O’Brien, G. and J. Opie [6]) uses 
cluster  analysis to  locate ‘vehicles’  of  representational  content 
within artificial  neural networks,  where  such clusters serve as 
surrogates for the classical notion of internal syntax. Along with 
serious  difficulties  in  equating  clusters  with  the  syntax  of 
traditional computation, I would contend that such attempts suffer 
from exactly  the  same built-in  tension that  afflicts  the  LOT 
model; namely, the purported content for which the clusters serve 
as vehicles  does no work in  the processing path leading from 
inputs to outputs.  Just as in the classical case, the postulation of 
content within the connectionist framework is gratuitous, because 
it plays no role in the cognitive manipulation of inputs to yield the 
salient  outputs.  Indeed,  if  content  weren’t  gratuitous,  then 
computational  versions  of  cognitive  processing  would  be 
lamentably deficient in terms of their specification of the inputs. 
These are characterized solely in formal or syntactical terms, and 
content is entirely absent from the external stimuli recognized by 
the  operations  that  can  be  defined  within  the  model.  If 
representational  content  were  at  all  relevant,  then  cognitive 
systems would have to process content  itself.  But  according to 
computational methods, content is not specified with the input, 
nor does it play any efficacious role in internal processing. So, 
from  a  perspective  that  takes  computation  as  the  theoretical 
foundation for cognition, it seems quite retrograde to posit content 
on top of the factors that do the actual work. Surely this is an 
exemplary occasion for invoking Ockham’s razor. 
3 THE CHINESE ROOM
Of course,  John  Searle’s celebrated  Chinese  Room Argument 
(henceforward CRA) [7] runs the dialectic in exactly the reverse 
direction:  rather  than  taking  the  formal,  syntactic  nature  of 
computation  as  a  reason for  eschewing  content in  a  properly 
naturalistic approach to  the  mind, Searle instead takes it  as  a 
reason for rejecting computation as the appropriate theory of the 
mental. 
So, from the perspective of the present discussion, it is 
instructive to  explicitly cast Searle’s  argument in terms of the 
separability of syntactical structure from its intended meaning. In 
what follows I will abstract away from the somewhat picturesque 
details of Searle’s original version and express the logical core of 
the CRA via two premises and a conclusion:
(1)  semantical  content is  an  essential  feature  of  the 
mind,
(2)  syntactical  manipulations  cannot  capture  this 
content, therefore
(3)  the  mind  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  system  of 
syntactical manipulations.
Preimse  (1)  is  an  expression  of  the  traditional conception of 
mentality, and is accepted by both Searle and by his opponents in 
orthodox cognitive science  and  AI.  As  stated  above,  classical 
cognitive science and AI view the mind according to the model of 
rule governed symbol manipulation, and premise (1) is embraced 
insofar  as  the  manipulated symbols  are  supposed  to  possess 
representational content. Searle’s dispute with cognitive science 
and  AI  centers  on  his  rejection  of  the  idea  that  internal 
computation can shed any  real  light  on mental  content, which 
leads to his conclusion (3), and to a concomitant dismissal of the 
research paradigm central to cognitive science and AI. 
In  response,  a  standard  line  for  defenders  of  the 
paradigm is to try and defuse the CRA by arguing against premise 
(2), and claiming that the manipulated symbols really do possess 
some canonical meaning or privileged interpretation. However, I 
would urge that this is a strategic error for those who wish to 
defend  the  computational  approach.  As  stated  above,  a 
distinguishing mathematical  virtue of  computational systems  is 
precisely the fact that the formal calculus can be executed without 
any appeal to meaning. Not only is an interpretation intrinsically 
unnecessary  to  the  operation of  computational  procedures,  but 
furthermore, there is no unique interpretation determined by the 
computational syntax, and in general there are arbitrarily many 
distinct models for any given formal system. 
Many classical  negative results in mathematical  logic 
stem from this separability between formal syntax and meaning. 
The various upward and downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorems 
show that formal systems cannot capture intended meaning with 
respect  to  infinite  cardinalities.  As  another  eminent  example, 
Gödel’s  incompleteness  results involve taking  a formal system 
designed to be ‘about’  the natural  numbers, and systematically 
reinterpreting it in terms of its own syntax and proof structure. As 
a consequence of this ‘unintended’ interpretation, Gödel is able to 
prove that  arithmetical  truth,  an  exemplary  semantical notion, 
cannot, in principle, be captured by finitary proof-theoretic means.
Computational  formalisms  are  syntactically  closed 
systems, and in this regard it is fitting to view them in narrow or 
solipsistic terms. They are, by their very nature, independent of 
the ‘external world’ of their intended meaning and, as mentioned 
above, they are incapable  of  capturing  a  unique interpretation, 
since they cannot distinguish between any number of alternative 
models.  This  can  be  encapsulated in  the  observation that  the 
relation between syntax and semantics is fundamentally  one-to-
many;  any  given  formal  system  will  have  arbitrarily  many 
different  interpretations.  And  this  intrinsically  one-to-many 
character obviates the possibility of deriving or even attributing a 
unique semantical content merely on the basis of computational 
structure.
These  (and a  host of  other)  powerful results on  the 
inherent limitations of syntactical methods would seem to cast a 
rather  deflationary  light  on  the  project  of  explicating  mental 
content within a computational framework.  Indeed, they would 
seem to render such goals as providing a computational account 
of  natural  language  semantics  or  propositional  attitude  states 
profoundly problematic. Non-standard models exist even for such 
rigorously  defined  domains  as  first-order  arithmetic  and  fully 
axiomatized geometry.  And if  the  precise,  artificial  system of 
first-order  arithmetic cannot even  impose isomorphism  on  its 
various models, how then could a program, designed to process a 
specific  natural  language,  say Chinese,  supply  a  basis for  the 
claim that the units of Chinese syntax posses a unique meaning?
So I think that the advocates of computationalism make 
the wrong move by accepting Searle’s bait and taking on board 
the  seemingly  intransigent  ‘symbol  grounding  problem’  that 
results. Instead I would accept Searle’s negative premise (2) and 
agree that computation is too weak to underwrite any interesting 
version of (1). Hence I would concur with Searle’s reasoning to 
the extent of accepting the salient conditional claim that if  (1) is 
true then (3) is true as well. So the real crux of the issue lies in the 
truth-value of (1), without which the consequent of the  if-then 
statement cannot be detached as a free-standing conclusion. Only 
by accepting the traditional, a priori notion of mentality assumed 
in premise (1), does (3) follow from the truth of (2). And it’s here 
that I would diverge from the views of both Searle and orthodox 
cognitive science.
4 CONSCIOUS PRESENTATION 
In explicating and defending his pivotal premise (1), Searle [8, 9] 
again  follows  Brentano,  in  claiming  that  the  human  mind 
possesses  original  intentionality  because  it  can  experience 
conscious presentations  of  the  objects  that  its  representational 
states are ‘about’. Thus it is conscious experience that ultimately 
underwrites the intrinsic aboutness of genuine intentional states. 
So Searle holds that consciousness supplies the basis for the truth 
of premise (1), and he further believes that consciousness arises 
from the  specific  causal  powers  of  the  brain  considered  as  a 
physical structure, rather than from multiply  realizable  symbol 
manipulation. Hence intentionality is tethered to brain processes 
via consciousness, and Searle thereby attempts to naturalize the 
traditional notion of mentality, while at the same time discrediting 
the computational paradigm, since he argues that computation has 
nothing to do with consciousness.
And  while  I  would  agree  with  Searle’s  view  that 
consciousness  arises  from physical  brain  activities  rather than 
from  multiply  realizable  computational  structure,  I  would 
nevertheless argue, contra Searle, that conscious experience, just 
like  symbol  manipulation,  is  too  weak  to  underwrite  any 
interesting  version of  tenet (1).  With respect to  the  view that 
conscious experience is the cornerstone of intentionality, the CRA 
simply  begs  the  question,  because  it  presupposes  that  the 
homunculus Searle, replete with conscious presentations,  really 
does understand English in some special way. Searle appeals to 
himself  as  the  locus  of  genuine intentionality  in  the  Chinese 
Room, and he would support  this by citing the fact that  he is 
consciously aware of the meanings of English expressions. For 
example, he can entertain a conscious image of the referent of the 
English string  ‘h-a-m-b-u-r-g-e-r’,  while  for him the strings of 
Chinese characters are completely devoid of conscious meanings. 
Ostensibly, this special understanding of English enables him to 
follow the program and manipulate the  ‘meaningless’  Chinese 
symbols. Hence lack of conscious presentation with respect to the 
semantics of Chinese constitutes the real asymmetry between the 
two languages,  and  this  underlies  Searle’s claim  that  genuine 
understanding occurs  in  the case of  one language and not the 
other. 
But this line of thought is not particularly compelling, 
since one can easily concede that Searle has episodes of conscious 
awareness which attend his processing of English, while at the 
same time denying that these episodes are sufficient to establish 
intrinsic content, or to ground the semantics of natural language 
expressions.  Indeed,  the  mere  occurrence  of  conscious 
presentations is too weak to even establish that they themselves 
play a role in Searle’s ability to follow the English instruction 
manual. Instead, I would argue that what consciousness actually 
provides is the foundation for the subjective  impression, had by 
Searle and others, that the human mind enjoys some mysterious 
and seemingly magical form of intentionality with the power to 
uniquely determine representational content. 
Thus when Searle contends that our mental states are 
‘really about’ various external objects and states of affairs, this is 
merely an expression of the fact that, introspectively, it seems to 
us as  if  our  mental  states  had  some  such  special  property. 
Conscious experience is clearly sufficient to provide the source 
for this belief, since conscious experience determines how (some 
of) our mental states appear to us. But it cannot provide a basis for 
concluding  that  the  belief  is  true,  unless  consciousness  is 
something much more mysterious and powerful than the resources 
of  natural  science  can  allow.  Brentano  famously  dismissed 
naturalism, and he thereby gave himself some room for the claim 
that consciousness underwrites the mind’s essential intentionality. 
However, if one accepts naturalism and views consciousness as a 
phenomenon  supported  by,  say,  the  causal  properties  of 
electrochemical reactions taking place inside the skull, then one 
should just bite the bullet and accept that it is too weak to support 
Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is an essential feature of the 
mind.
It would be straying too far from the main goal of the 
article  to  expand on this  latter  claim at  any great  length, but 
considerations  based  on  the  ‘narrow’  status  of  consciousness 
should suffice to illustrate the central point. It is widely held by 
naturalists that  occurrent conscious states must  supervene upon 
occurrent, internal, physical states and processes of organisms. As 
a consequence, something outside the boundaries of an organism 
cannot affect consciousness, unless it makes some relevant impact 
on  the  occurrent,  internal physical  states  and processes,  most 
typically through inputs to the sensory mechanisms. But then the 
objection raised by Searle in the CRA against the computational 
paradigm comes back to undermine his own position: the relation 
between consciousness and its object becomes one-to-many, just 
as the relation between computational syntax and its interpretation 
is one-to-many. Any number of different external causes could 
yield exactly the same conscious experience (by inducing exactly 
the same internal physical states and processes), just as a given 
formal system can have arbitrarily many distinct interpretations. 
Therefore conscious experience is, by its very nature, too weak to 
determine a unique object that one is conscious of. This problem 
is  at  the heart of Cartesian scepticism, and it  only gets worse 
within the narrow confines of naturalism. In a more contemporary 
guise, Putnam’s celebrated brains-in-a-vat argument [10] exploits 
this solipsistic feature to show that conscious psychological states 
are too weak to capture the semantics of natural language. 
5 ANTI-REPRESENTATIONALISM
There have been a number of high profile positions advanced in 
negative reaction to ‘classical’  cognitive science that take anti-
representationalism as one their hallmarks, including dynamical 
systems theory (e.g Van Gelder [11]), behaviour based robotics 
(e.g.  Brooks  [12]),  approaches  utilizing  sensory-motor 
affordances (e.g. Noё [13]), and some varieties of connectionism. 
A common factor is that these views all advance some version of 
the slogan ‘intelligence without representation’.  In order to locate 
my position on the salient  philosophical landscape, it  is  worth 
noting that it  is  not anti-representational in this sense.  On my 
view, there could well be internal structures that play many of the 
roles that people would ordinarily expect of representations, and 
this is especially true at the level  of perception, sensory-motor 
control and navigation. So I would be quite happy to accept things 
like spatial encodings, somatic emulators, internal mirrorings of 
relevant aspects of the external environment. Ultimately this boils 
down to questions that have to be settled empirically in the case of 
biologically  induced  agents,  but  unlike  the  anti-
representationalists, I do not deny that the most plausible form of 
cognitive architecture may well incorporate internal structures and 
stand-ins  that  many  people  would  be  tempted  to  call 
‘representations’. 
But I would argue that this label should be construed 
purely in a weak, operational sense, and should not be conflated 
with the more robust traditional conception. To the extent that 
internal structures can encode, mirror or model external objects 
and  states  of  affairs,  they  do  so  via  their  own causal  and/or 
syntactic properties. And again, to the extent that they influence 
behaviour or  the internal processing of inputs to yield outputs, 
they  do  this  solely  in  virtue  of  their  causal  and/or  syntactic 
properties. There is nothing about  these internal structures that 
could  support  Searle’s  or  Brentano’s  notion  of  original 
intentionality, and there is no independent or objective fact of the 
matter regarding their ‘real’ content or meaning. 
So  what  I  deny  is  not  that  there  may  be  internal 
mechanisms that reflect external properties in various systematic 
and biologically useful ways. Instead I would deny that there is 
anything  more to  this  phenomenon  than  highly  sensitive  and 
evolved relations of calibration between the internal workings of 
an  organism  and  its  specialized  environmental  context. 
Evolutionary history can be invoked to yield interesting heuristics 
with respect to these physical relations of calibration, and perhaps 
support  counterfactuals  regarding  their  role  in  the  organism’s 
adaptive success. But evolution is based on random mutation, and 
natural ‘selection’ is an equally purposeless mechanism. Neither 
can  provide the  theoretical  resources sufficient  to  ground  the 
strong traditional notion of ‘genuine aboutness’. 
Thus if I had to coin a competing slogan to encapsulate 
my  own  position,  it  would be  something  like  ‘representation 
without intentionality’. If one is truly committed to naturalism, 
then there is only a difference of degree and complexity, but not 
in kind between, say, the reflection of moonlight in a pond and the 
retinal image of  the  moon in  some  organism’s  visual system. 
Proponents of  the  orthodox view are  inclined  to  think  that  a 
sufficient difference in degree and complexity somehow yields an 
esoteric difference in kind, a difference that allows us to cross the 
conceptual boundary from mere causal correlations to ‘genuine 
aboutness’. But I would contend that naturalism itself supplies an 
asymptotic  limit  for  this  curve,  and that  the  boundary  can be 
crossed only by invoking non-natural factors. 
6 CONCLUSION
According to the position advocated herein, Fodor’s characteristic 
insistence  on representational  content  embodies  an unfortunate 
commitment  to  an a priori view of the mind that does not fit 
within the context of naturalistic explanation. The crucial point to 
notice is that internal ‘representations’ do all their scientifically 
tangible  cognitive work  solely  in  virtue  of  their 
physical/formal/mathematical  structure.  There is  nothing about 
them,  qua  efficacious  elements  of  internal  processing,  that  is 
‘about’ anything else. Content is not an explicit component of the 
input,  nor  is  it  acted  upon  or  transformed  via  cognitive 
computations. All that is explicitly present and causally relevant 
are computational structure plus supporting physical mechanisms, 
which  is  exactly  what  one  would  expect  from a  naturalistic 
account. 
In order for cognitive structures to do their job, there is 
no need to posit some additional ‘content’, ‘semantical value’, or 
‘external referent’. Such representation talk may serve a useful 
heuristic role,  but  it  remains  a  conventional,  observer-relative 
ascription,  and accordingly  there’s  no  independent  fact  of  the 
matter, and so there isn’t a sense in which it’s  possible to go 
wrong  or  be  mistaken about  what  an  internal configuration is 
‘really’ about. Instead, representational content can projected onto 
an internal structure when this type of gloss plays an opportune 
role  in  characterizing the  overall  processing  activities  which 
govern the system’s interactions with its environment, and hence 
in predicting its salient input/output patterns. But it is simply a 
matter of convenience, convention and choice, and does not reveal 
an underlying fact of the matter nor any essential characteristics of 
the system.
 From the point of view of the system, these internal 
structures are manipulated directly, and the notion that they are 
‘directed towards’ something else plays no role in the pathways 
leading from cognitive inputs  to intelligent outputs.  Hence the 
symbol grounding problem is a red herring – it isn’t necessary to 
quest after some elusive and mysterious layer of ‘real’ content, for 
which these internal structures serve as the mere syntactic vehicle. 
Syntactical  and  physical  processes  are  all  we  have,  and  their 
efficacy is not affected by the purported presence or absence of 
meaning.  I  would  argue  that  the  computational  paradigm  is 
thematically  inconsistent  with  the  search  for  content  or  its 
supposed vehicles. Instead, the concern of computational models 
of cognition should be with the internal processing structures that 
yield  the  right  kinds  of  input/output  profiles  of  a  system 
embedded in a particular environmental context, and with how 
such  processing  structures  are  implemented  in  the  system’s 
physical machinery. These are the factors that do the work and are 
sufficient to explain all of the empirical  data, and they do this 
using the normal theoretical resources of natural science. Indeed, 
the postulation of content as the essential feature distinguishing 
mental  from  non-mental  systems  should  be  seen  as  the  last 
remaining  vestige  of  Cartesian  dualism,  and,  contra  Fodor, 
naturalized cognition has no place for a semantical ‘ghost in the 
machine’. When it comes to computation and content, only the 
vehicle is required, not the excess baggage.
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